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COMMENTS
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Trustees in Bankruptcy
I. Introduction
Federal labor legislation' and federal bankruptcy legislation2 demonstrate congressional awareness of opposing policies at work in two very
different areas of the law. The general purpose of the Labor-Management
Relations Act 3 is to encourage the creation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. 4 Similarly, in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), Congress has adopted a policy that fosters arbitration and
guarantees certain employee rights.5 The Railway Labor Act 6 is a specific
application of the NLRA to the interstate carrier segment of the economy.
Its policy is to resolve labor disputes quickly in order to avoid disruption of
interstate commerce. 7
The Bankruptcy Act,' while it contains no express statement of
I. Federal labor legislation is codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, with the
exception of the Railway Labor Act, codified in Title 45.
2. Federal bankruptcy legislation is codified in Title II of the United States Code.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
4. That section reads in pertinent part:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations
whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general
welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes
affecting commerce.
Id.
5. For a survey of the historical background out of which the NLRA arose, see C.
GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (1946). More detailed analyses appear in J. JENKINS, LABOR
LAwv (1968) and I L. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940).

6. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1970).
7. That policy is expressed as follows:
The purposes of the chapter are: (I)To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the
operation of any carrier engaged therein . . . (4) to provide for the prompt and
orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
Id. § 151a.
8. II U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

congressional policy, has as its principal purposes preserving a debtor's
funds for distribution to creditors and affording the debtor a "new start." 9
Common to bankruptcy proceedings'° is the power of a trustee or debtor in
possession" to reject executory contracts entered into by the bankrupt
that are deemed onerous and burdensome to the bankrupt estate.2 Conversely, a petition for rejection of a contract beneficial to the estate will
normally be denied by the bankruptcy court. 13 But when rejection is
permitted, the executory contract must be rejected in its entirety. The
trustee has no authority to sever beneficial sections of the contract and keep
14
them in force.
This comment focuses on section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, the
provision within chapter X that allows the trustee in bankruptcy to reject
executory contracts. Although the language of that section appears absolute, the courts have added the "onerous and burdensome to the estate"
limitation alluded to above. This limitation looks to the effect of the
executory contract on the estate, and is blind to the type of executory
contract capable of rejection. "The Bankruptcy Act makes no distinction
among the classes of executory contracts. "'5This theory has resulted in the
9. Costa, Bankruptcy: The Legal Whipping Boy, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 52 (1974-75);
Note, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1968-69).

10. Chapters Ito VII of the Bankruptcy Act deal with "ordinary bankruptcies" seeking
liquidation of a bankrupt's assets and their distribution to creditors. Chapter X provides for
the reorganization of corporations that are insolvent or unable to meet their debts as they
mature. Corporations that cannot be afforded relief under Chapter XI because rights of
secured creditors may be affected are limited to a Chapter X proceeding. Chapter XI provides
for arrangements such as settlements, compositions, or extensions of time for payment,
which may enable the debtor to continue its business with little court interference. Under
Chapter XI, the rights of secured creditors may not be affected. For a general treatment of the
various types of bankruptcy proceedings, see G. HIRSCH, ARRANGEMENTSUNDER CHAPTER XI
(1968); L. FORMAN, COMPOSITIONS, BANKRUPTCY, AND ARRANGEMENTS (1971).

11. Section 33 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 61 (1970), creates the office of trustee
in bankruptcy. The trustee is appointed by the creditors pursuant to § 44 of the Bankruptcy
Act, II U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
Section 342 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970), provides that when no trustee
or receiver is appointed in a Chapter XI proceeding, the debtor shall continue in possession of
property and have all powers of a trustee.
12. Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § I10(b) (1970), provides:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an unexpired
lease of real property, within sixty days after the adjudication or within thirty days
after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later ...
Section 116(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970), is similar to § 313(1), 11
U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970). Section 313(1) provides the following:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers,
and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this Chapter-(l) permit the rejection
of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the parties to such contracts and
to such other parties in interest as the court may designate.
Executory contracts capable of rejection have been defined as "a contract under which
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed
that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other." Countryman, Contracts in Bankruptcy,57 MINN. L. REV. 439,

460 (1973).
13.
COLLIER
14.
15.

In re Grayson Shops, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 8W. COLLIER,
ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.15[8] (14th ed. 1976).
8 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.15[7] (14th ed. 1976).
In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

assumption that collective bargaining agreements remain executory contracts until the date of their termination, so that agreements are susceptible
to rejection pursuant to section 313(1), assuming their onerous and
burdensome nature. 16
The mere prospect of a bankruptcy court rejecting a collective
bargaining agreement invariably arouses the ire of labor adherents. The
same effect can be seen in the management ranks of financially troubled
concerns whenever the prospect of affirmance arises. The labor constituents point to labor legislation as assertively as management points to
the Bankruptcy Act, each in support of their seemingly conflicting positions. In the face of these contrary positions, courts have been quick to
deny the existence of any "real" conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and
the labor acts. 17 But arguments in support of the existence of a conflict are
compelling.
If rejection of collective bargaining agreements is allowed the policy
of the labor acts may be defeated, since employees may lose benefits
attainable only in the context of collective bargaining. On the other hand,
failure to reject a truly burdensome labor agreement may contravene the
policy of the Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, since the trustee or debtor in
8
possession is a new entity, different from the pre-bankrupt employer,'
disallowance of rejection may violate section 8(d) of the NLRA, which
provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
...

I,19 Yet, although language in both the Bankruptcy Act and the

labor acts would lead one to believe that they were drafted to cope with
possible conflicts, the courts steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the conflicts' existence. 20
16. The few reported cases that have dealt with the question of the power of a trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid a collective bargaining agreement are: Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney
Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc.,
238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd in part, 161 F.2d 762
(3d Cir. 1947). To this list, unchanged since 1968, can be added two recent cases: Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975); Shopmen's
Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
17. Allegations by employees and their unions that federal labor legislation has so
preempted the field of labor relations as to take collective bargaining agreements out of the
scope of the Bankruptcy Act have, likewise, been summarily rejected. Carpenters Local 2746
v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173
F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
18. This point was clearly announced in Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods.,
Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), and restated in Brotherhood of Ry., Airline&S.S. Clerks v.
REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970). The Supreme Court has recently held that one succeeding
to the business of another is not bound by the substantive terms of the predecessor's
collective bargaining contract. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd.,
417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
20. Section 272 of the Bankruptcy Act, i U.S.C. § 672 (1970), and § 15 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 165 (1970), are cross-referenced, with the
provision that the LMRA prevail in cases of conflict. See note 17 and accompanying text
supra.

This comment explores the current status of the power of the trustee in
bankruptcy to reject collective bargaining agreements. Recent developments in the "successor employer" or "successorship" doctrine will be
discussed to the extent that the Supreme Court has dealt with the propriety
of continuing a collective bargaining agreement when a new employer
succeeds to a business. Finally, two recent cases are analyzed that have
treated this issue and highlighted the divergent policies of the Bankruptcy
Act and the labor acts."
II. Survival of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Successorship
Cases
A.

Origins and Development of the Successorship Doctrine22

The successor employer doctrine grew out of the long-standing
maxim that one cannot be bound to the terms of a contract to which one is
not a party. In reliance on this axiom, employers acquiring the businesses
of others have petitioned the courts for relief from the terms of their
predecessors' collective bargaining agreements. 23 The validity of this
argument was first considered by the Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston.24 Plaintiff, the successor employer in that case, was the
surviving corporation in a merger. In the union's suit to compel Wiley to
arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement between the union and
the merged corporation, the Court held that Wiley's obligation to arbitrate
was rooted in national labor policy.25 This holding, which in effect bound
one not a party to a contract to its substantive terms, was explained in the
following manner:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would
not bind to a contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting
party, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract. . . . Central to the peculiar status and function of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact. . . that it is not in26any real

sense the simple product of a consensual relationship.
Eight years later, in NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services,
Inc. ,27 the Supreme Court again addressed the successorship issue. In that
case, the guards of Wackenhut Corporation, which provided security
services at a California airport, had negotiated a three-year contract
between Wackenhut and the United Plant Guard Workers union (UPG).
Burns replaced Wackenhut and employed twenty-seven of Wackenhut's
guards along with fifteen of its own. UPG demanded that Burns recognize
the union and honor the terms of the agreement between UPG and
21. See note 18 supra.
22. From this point on, all references to trustee or debtor in possession will be made in
the context of a Chapter XI rearrangement proceeding unless otherwise noted.
23. See Charles Cushman Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 90 (1939).
24. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
25. Id. at 550-51.
26. Id. at 550.
27. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).

Wackenhut. The court held that Burns, the successor, was under a
statutorily imposed duty to bargain with the representative of the majority
28
of its employees.
The Court carefully noted that the statutorily imposed duty to bargain
in good faith does not carry with it the Wiley duty to honor the terms of a
predecessor's agreement. "[A]lIthough successor employers may be bound
to recognize and bargain with the union, they are not bound by the
substantive provisions of a collective bargaining contract negotiated by
their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them.'" 29 Wiley was
distinguished on the grounds that under the state law applicable to that
case, the surviving corporation in a merger is obligated to assume the duties
of the merged corporation.3 0 The result of Burns is that the duty to bargain
with the representative of the predecessor's employees arises when a
majority of the successor's work force consists of the predecessor's em31
ployees.
Two years later the Supreme Court again chose to review the
successorship question. Howard Johnson Company, Inc. v. DetroitLocal
Joint Executive Board3 2 represents an attempt to eradicate some of the
confusion engendered by Burns and Wiley. Like Wiley, HowardJohnson
was a suit to compel arbitration against a successor that had acquired the
business by purchase. Unlike Burns, it was a case in which a majority of
Howard Johnson's employees had not been employees of the predecessor.3 3 Proceeding in the traditional case-by-case approach, 34 the Court
construed Wiley as having stood for the proposition that arbitration could
not be compelled unless there existed a substantial continuity of identity in
the business enterprise. 3 5 The Court then modified that proposition, stating
that "this continuity of identity in the business enterprise necessarily
includes . . .a substantial continuity in the identity of the work force
28. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970),
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his emplovees, subject to the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title."
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), provides that
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining ...
29. 406 U.S. 272, 284 (1972).
30.

N.Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 90 (McKinney 1951).

31. "[W]here the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees
hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent there is
little basis for faulting the Board's . . .ordering the employer to bargain.
406 U.S.
272, 281 (1972).
32. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
33. Of the forty-five employees hired by Howard Johnson after it succeeded to the
business, only nine had been employees of the predecessor.
34. [W]e must necessarily proceed cautiously, in the traditional case-by-case
approach of the common law. Particularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can
arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the
facts of each case as it arises is especially appropriate.
417 U.S. at 256.
35. Id. at 263.

across the change in ownership." 36 Since Howard Johnson had not hired a
majority of its predecessor's employees, substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise was found to be lacking. The Wiley duty to
arbitrate had therefore been improperly imposed by the lower courts. The
Burns duty to bargain under sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA was also
inapplicable since the union seeking to compel arbitration was not the
37
representative of a majority of the employees hired by the successor.
In its current status, the successorship doctrine imposes no obligation
upon one succeeding to the ongoing business of another, absent a substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise and its work force, to
honor collective bargaining agreements of the predecessor. If, however, a
majority of the successor's employees were also employees of the predecessor, then if the bargaining unit remains appropriate the successor has a
statutory duty to bargain in good faith. Even if the two substantial
continuities are found to exist, however, Wiley has been so weakened by
Burns and Howard Johnson that its continued vitality is debatable. It is
highly questionable whether courts will impose any duty on a successor to
honor the substantive terms of a predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement. 38
B.

Applicability of the Doctrine to Trustees in Bankruptcy
That labor legislation applies to trustees in bankruptcy is explicit in
the Labor-Management Relations Act." It follows that judicial doctrines
evolved in interpretation of that legislation are also applicable to trustees.
Until recently, however, the applicability of the successorship doctrine to
the trustee in bankruptcy was questionable.n° Those cases that imposed any
successor's duties on the trustee did so without reference to the successorship doctrine. 4 '
36. Id.
37. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
38. For a more detailed analysis of the development of the successorship doctrine, see
Note, The BargainingObligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1974-75);
Note, Successor Management's Obligations Under Existing Collective BargainingAgreements, 40 Mo. L. REV. 304 (1975); Comment, Collective Bargainingand Bankruptcy, 42 S.
CAL. L. REV. 477 (1968-69); Note, Labor Law Successorship, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 798

(1975).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970) includes trustees in bankruptcy in the definition of "persons" to whom the Act applies.
40. In Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975), the
court hinted that the duties of a successor employer may be applicable to the trustee. In
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), that
hint was developed fully and the duties expounded by the Supreme Court in Burns were held
applicable to the debtor in possession.
41. The reason for the paucity of cases was explained by the Second Circuit:
The issue, of course, has not been litigated frequently. The reasons are not difficult
to discern. In a Chapter X or XI proceeding, which is designed to preserve a going
business, only a hardy-some might say foolhardy--employer would provoke a
strike by trying to terminate an existing labor contract. . . .And in a straight
bankruptcy proceeding, which normally results in liquidation, there are usually no
jobs or wage rates to preserve for any appreciable period. ...
Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 703 (2nd Cir. 1975).

Nevertheless, there seems little to preclude the application of that
doctrine to the trustee. Trustees most often assume control when there
exists continuity of identity in both the business enterprise and the work
force. Indeed, the trustee's task is to prevent a change in continuity in the
business enterprise. In order to accomplish that task, continuity of the work
force is necessary. Thus it is not unreasonable to order a trustee to bargain
with the representative of the debtor's employees or, depending on the
status of Wiley, to honor the substantive terms of the debtor's labor
agreement with the employees' union.
The dearth of cases dealing with the divergent interests of the trustee
and employees in petitions for rejection of collective bargaining agreements makes any discussion of the propriety of imposing successorship
duties on a trustee largely speculative. 4 2 The few cases that have considered this question have arisen as a result of petitions by trustees to reject
collective bargaining agreements. Most of those cases have allowed
rejection, rendering moot the question of the imposition of the Wiley duty
to honor the substantive terms of the predecessor's contract.43 Even if
rejection is permitted, however, there is nothing to impede imposition of
the Burns obligation of bargaining in good faith, assuming the two
substantial continuities are present. 44
III. Earlier Cases Allowing Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements
As stated above, the few cases 45 considering a trustee's power to
reject a collective bargaining agreement have generally allowed rejection.
That power, however, has been limited in the same manner as the trustee's
power to reject other types of executory contracts. The agreement must be
onerous, burdensome, or detrimental to the estate of the debtor before the
46
court in its discretion may properly allow rejection.
42. Seven federal cases consider the~power of a trustee to reject collective bargaining
agreements. See note 16 supra. See also In re Business Supplies Corp. of America, 72 CCH
Lab. Cas. 13,940 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Bankruptcy Court).
43. One of the few cases denying the petition for rejection is In re Mamie Conti Gowns,
12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). Denial was prompted by fears that the petition had been
entered solely for the purpose of evading the labor agreement. In another case, In re Public
Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd in part, 161 F.2d 762,765 (3dCir. 1947),
rejection was disallowed because the court found "no act of the trustees.., inconsistent
with the terms of the contract," and "every act of the trustees in relation to the employees [to
be] in complete accord with its terms." Having "assumed" the existing agreement, petitioner
was denied the authority to reject.
44. When rejection is not sought by the trustee, of course, the issue does not arise. In
such cases, the trustee may be deemed to have assumed the existing agreement, thereby being
bound by its terms.
45. See note 16 supra. The factor held to be determinative in all of those cases was the
detrimental nature of the contract to the estate of the bankrupt employer.
46. "If the trustee deems the contract to possess no equity or benefit for the estate he
rejects it as burdensome. If, on the other hand, he concludes that the executory contract does
not have an equity for the estate he adopts it." In re Italian Cook Oil Co., 190 F.2d 994, 996 (3d
Cir. 1951) (rejection of contract of sale).

For example, In re KlaberBrothers, Inc.47 presented the sole issue of
the power of a trustee to avoid a collective bargaining agreement pursuant
to section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. Affirming the order of the referee
that the agreement could be rejected, the court held that the only criterion to
be considered in passing on the propriety of rejection of any executory
contract is whether that contract contains provisions detrimental to the
estate. 48 Noticeably absent from the court's consideration was any mention
of the effect of rejection on employees' rights. With the simple statements
that the "referee's determination was fully justified under the circumstances here involved ' 49 and "[wihere the contract is detrimental, its
rejection should be permitted, '"50 the labor agreement was set aside.5 1
The first case to encourage courts to "step lightly" when considering rejection of collective bargaining agreements was In re Overseas
National Airways.52 Rejection was disallowed, based on the express
provisions of section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act 53 and sections 2 and 6 of
the Railway Labor Act. 54 Adhering to the strict language of the applicable
acts, the court of appeals concluded that collective bargaining agreements
between interstate carriers and employee representatives can be modified
only in conformity with the provisions of the RLA. More importantly,
however, the court announced its concern for the adverse effects rejection
may have on employee rights.
[T]he Bankruptcy Court, when it has the power to reject a
collective bargaining agreement, should do so only after thorough
scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides, for,
in relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective
47. 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
48. "[Tlhe power to permit rejection of an executory contract should be exercised
where rejection is to the advantage of the estate. Where the contract is detrimental, its
rejection should be permitted." Id. at 85. The court also dismissed the union's contention that
the NLRB had preemptive jurisdiction. The union's reliance on § 15 of the LaborManagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 165 (1970), which provides that the labor act prevails
in cases of conflict with § 272 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 672 (1970), was held to have
been misplaced since those sections refer only to union organization.
49. 173 F. Supp. at 85.
50. Id. (citing the referee's opinion).
51. In another of the few reported cases in this area, Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney
Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968), the court acknowledged that the
trustee is bound to operate the business in compliance with the National Labor Relations Act.
If a union representing employees demands that a new contract be negotiated, it
would appear that the trustee must negotiate, and if he refuses to do so, he may be
guilty of an unfair labor practice. If a new contract is agreed upon, it may or may not
be identical or similar to the original agreement ...
Id. at 149. But no concern was expressed for, nor precautions taken against, the possible loss
of valuable employee rights attainable only through collective bargaining.
52. 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
53. Id. at 360. Section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970) provides:
"No judge or trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions of
railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in sections 151 to 163 of Title 45 ....
54. "No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner
prescribed in such agreements or in Section 156 of this title." 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
The RLA also provides a detailed procedure to be followed in changing rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions. Included in this procedure is a 30-day notice requirement,
conferences, and action by the Mediation Board. Id. § 156.

bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the employees affected
of their seniority, welfare and pension rights, as well as other
valuable benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a
provable claim for money damages. That would leave the employees without compensation for their losses, at the same time
enabling the debtor, at the expense of the employees, to consummate what may be
5 a more favorable plan of arrangement with its
other creditors.
This is the first case directly to address the competing interests of
trustees seeking rejection of collective bargaining agreements and unions
seeking their performance. The court realized that there is more at issue
than merely the power to reject an executory contract. In recognizing that
rights attainable only through the collective bargaining process might be
lost forever through rejection of the labor contract, the court presaged the
considerations to be given the same issue by courts in later cases.
IV.

Recent Developments

A.

Overview

Shopmen 's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.56 and Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.57 are
the first cases considering rejection of collective bargaining agreements by
trustees in bankruptcy since Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood
Products, Inc. 58 was decided in 1968. Kevin Steel is outstanding for its
pronouncement of factors to be considered by courts when passing on the
propriety of rejecting collective bargaining agreements. 59 REA Express is
noteworthy for its reconciliation of the different policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Act and the Railway Labor Act. Although the two cases arose
under different labor acts, Kevin Steel under the NLRA and REA Express
under the RLA, the Second Circuit addressed their common issue with a
common approach. 6°
B.

Kevin Steel-Facts and Analysis
1. The Facts.-A bankruptcy judge allowed rejection by Kevin
Steel, as debtor in possession, of the collective bargaining agreement then
in force. 6' In the appeal from this decision, the district court saw the issue
55. 238 F. Supp. at 361-62.
56. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
57. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
58. 289 F. Supp. 143 (W .D. Ark. 1968).
59. These factors are: (1) whether the employer is motivated merely by a desire to rid
itself of the union and its adherents; (2) the company's financial condition; (3) the source of
the company's financial difficulties; (4) benefits to be gained by the employer if rejection is
allowed; (5) the equities against rejection, including the loss of intangible employee rights. 519
F.2d at 707.
60. In REA Express the court relied heavily on the reasoning of Kevin Steel, decided
only weeks before REA Express.
61. Kevin Steel had filed for rearrangement pursuant to Chapter XI. Prior to filing, the
company had refused to execute a collective bargaining agreement to which it had agreed in
substance before the union's tender. The administrative law judge determined that the refusal

as a "question of how to reconcile the conflicting policies embodied
respectively in the National Labor Relations Act and in the Bankruptcy Act
or, if such reconciliation should be impossible, [a] question of which
policy is here to prevail."62 The NLRB argued 63 that the Bankruptcy Act's
specific exclusion of RLA agreements 64 expressed congressional policy
with respect to all labor agreements, and that the omission of specific
reference to the NLRA was merely a "legislative oversight.'"65 The district
court accepted this argument. Concluding that it was more logical to
assume that "Congress intended to distinguish collective bargaining
agreements as a class from all other contracts than that it intended to make
seemingly irrelevant distinctions between different kinds of labor agreements,' 66 the district court held that section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
did not allow rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
The circuit court reversed, holding that Kevin Steel was not a "party"
within the meaning of section 8(d) of the NLRA6 7 and that Kevin Steel was
therefore not bound by its agreement prior to bankruptcy nor by the
termination restrictions of section 8(d).68 The argument of the NLRB,
which the district court had accepted as "logical,''69 was rejected on
appeal. 70 The court also determined that no irreconcilable conflicts existed
between the Bankruptcy Act and the NLRA. 71 Recommending that courts
to accept the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice and ordered Kevin Steel to
execute the agreement, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (March 8, 1974). It was this order that prompted
the petition to reject the collective bargaining agreement.
62. 381 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court continued:
We are thus faced with two important policy decisions adopted by the Congress
which in this case come into square conflict. The Bankruptcy Law provides that
whenever necessary to preserve solvency the Bankruptcy Court may relieve a
debtor from the burdens of an executory contract. The [NLRA], on the other hand,
provides that no collective bargaining agreement can be set aside except pursuant to
the provisions of that law. ...
Id.
63. The NLRB appeared as intervenor.
64. See notes 53, 54 and accompanying text supra.
65. 381 F. Supp. at 338. The cases on which the NLRB relied for support of its
proposition were John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1963), and United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 754 (1960).
66. 381 F. Supp. at 338.
67. The section provides that "where there is in effect a collective bargaining contract
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that no party to such contractshall terminate or modify" the agreement, except in
accordance with certain enumerated procedures. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
68. A debtor-in-possession under Chapter XI or under Chapter X, a trustee under
the latter chapter, or a trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding is not the same
entity as the pre-bankruptcy company. A new entity is created with its own rights
and duties. . . . Until the debtor here assumes the old agreement or makes a new
one, it is not a 'party' under section 8(d) to any labor agreement with the union and is
simply not subject to the termination restrictions of the section.
519 F.2d at 704.
69. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
70. [I]t would be wrong to assume that whatever Congress enacted with respect to
the labor relations of those employers covered by the Railway Labor Act should
automatically be applied to other employers. The distinct problems of the former
group and their importance to the national economy are well recognized. . and are
highlighted by the differences between the [RLA] and the [NLRA].
519 F.2d at 705.
71. We recognize, of course, that the policies animating the two statutes are

carefully scrutinize petitions to reject collective bargaining agreements,
the court listed five factors to be considered72 and remanded the case with
instructions that the district court "reconsider carefully the exercise of
discretion that it felt it did not have." 73 It appears, then, that the power of a
trustee in bankruptcy to reject a collective bargaining agreement is no
longer open to question, at least in the Second Circuit. The propriety of
exercising that power, however, remains a question that must be answered
by examination of the facts of each case.
2. Analysis.-Upon initial analysis Kevin Steel stands apart from
the earlier cases dealing with collective bargaining agreements and bankruptcy trustees .7' The court addressed the potential conflict directly,
successfully harmonizing the policies at work within the Bankruptcy Act
and the labor acts. In so doing, the court remained cognizant of the rights
and concerns of both employer and employees. More importantly, the
court established guidelines to be followed in passing on the propriety of
75
allowing rejection in any given case.
(a) No direct conflict between section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act and
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA. 76-In spite of the oft-repeated
contentions that the above-cited sections conflict 77 and that in cases of
conflict the labor laws prevail, 78 the Kevin Steel court arrived at a different
conclusion. The company and the debtor in possession are not the same
entity. When a trustee or debtor in possession is named, a new entity is
created, to which rights and obligations attach. 79 Among those obligations
is the duty to comply with the labor acts. 80 But since the debtor in
possession is a new entity, it is not a "party" to the existing collective
bargaining agreement. Until the old agreement is ratified or a new
agreement is entered into, the trustee is not a party to any labor agreement.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA is not applicable and no conflict exists between
81
that section and section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act .
The court reached a proper decision. A finding that one act preempted
different. . . . But it must be remembered that.

. . the Bankruptcy Act even in its

present form does not authorize a debtor-in-possession to ignore its obligations
under the Labor Act.
Id. at 706.
72. See note 59 supra.
73. 519 F.2d at 707.
74. The district court's decision stands alone in holding that a bankruptcy court lacks
the power to relieve a debtor from the burdens of a collective bargaining agreement.
75. See note 59 supra.
76. The NLRB contended that a holding that § 313(l) authorizes rejection of collective
bargaining agreements would allow an employer to terminate such an agreement unilaterally,
in direct conflict with § 8(d) of the NLRA, which provides procedures to be followed in cases
of contract termination. Such a holding would, in the Board's opinion, throw the acts into
irreconcilable conflict.
77. See cases cited note 16 supra.
78. See In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Business Supplies
Corp. of America, 72 CCH Lab. Cas. 13,940 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
79. 519 F.2d at 704. A similar proposition, going to the section 8(d) prohibition against
compelling a party to come to terms, was discussed in Burns, 406 U.S. at 282.
80. National Labor Relations Act § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See note 39 supra.
81. 519 F.2d at 704.

the other would have defeated the policy of the preempted act. Reconciliation of the acts,when considered in conjunction with the five factors to be
evaluated before rejection is permitted, provides protection for all parties.
By limiting rejection of collective bargaining agreements to cases in which
disallowance would result in liquidation, the court benefited all. In such
cases, if rejection is allowed, the business enterprise will continue, the jobs
will remain in existence, and the employees can seek collective bargaining
pursuant to the NLRA. In a truly meritorious case, rejection, although it
entails some inconvenience and losses for employees, is the only viable
solution.
(b) Special nature of collective bargainingagreements does not alone
exclude them from coverage of section 313(1).82-Analogies made by the
NLRB to the special provisions of section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act8 3 as
it relates to the RLA were held to be inappropriate. To hold that section
313(1) excluded from its scope collective bargaining agreements would be
tantamount to amending the Bankruptcy Act, a task properly left to the
legislature.8 n Given the option of judicially amending the Bankruptcy Act
to exclude collective bargaining agreements from the scope of section
313(1) or of judicially accommodating the policies of the Bankruptcy Act
and the NLRA, the court opted for the latter. The language of the section
imposes no restriction on the type of executory contract that can be
rejected. The court was not prepared to modify that language."
(c) Factorsto be considered in determining the proprietyof rejection.The Kevin Steel court outlined several considerations for the district court
on remand. 86 These considerations ensure that rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement will be permitted only if the employees are caused no
undue hardship by the rejection. They spring from the court's realization
that the only means of effectuating the policies of the acts is to construe
87
each in light of the other.
82. The NLRB contended, in conformity with the district court's holding, that Congress had intended to distinguish colleotive bargaining agreements as a class from all other
contracts and that § 313(1) did not apply to collective bargaining agreements.
83.

II U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970).

84. 519 F.2d at 705. In support of its contention that the special nature of collective
bargaining agreements excludes them from the coverage of § 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act,
the NLRB relied on language describing collective bargaining agreements as not "ordinary"
contracts and "unique." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
85. The court also applied the successorship principles announced in Burns. Although
not a "party" to the agreement sought to be rejected within the meaning of section 8(d) of the
NLRA, and hence not bound by the restrictions of that section, the successor cannot ignore
its responsibilities under the labor act. The court hinted that the obligations of a successor
employer may fall upon the debtor in possession: "It may be that the obligations of such a
trustee or debtor in possession are analogous to those of a successor employer.
... 519
F.2d at 704.
86.

See note 59 supra.

87. The decision to allow rejection should not be based solely on whether it will
improve the financial status of the debtor. Such a narrow approach totally ignores
the policies of the Labor Act and makes no attempt to accommodate to them.
519 F.2d at 707.

First, the court required that an employer demonstrate that it is not
petitioning in bankruptcy solely to rid itself of a collective bargaining
agreement. The NLRB's contention that allowing rejection would result in
an opening of the floodgates to disgruntled employers was thereby foreclosed. While not a new premise, 88 this consideration has become, at least
in the Second Circuit, a question of first priority to be answered with
convincing proof. By also requiring clear evidence of the petitioning
employer's financial condition, the court further ensured that an undeserving employer does not slip out of a labor agreement .89 Only in cases in
which the agreement is burdensome and detrimental to the estate of the
employer will rejection properly be allowed. An employer not on the brink
of financial ruin suffers no injustice from a denial of rejection.
Secondly, the court suggested that the source of the employer's
difficulties be probed, i.e., that care be taken to sort out fraudulent claims,
for when business declines and debts begin to mount, it may take only a
little "doctoring" of the books to support a bankruptcy petition. 90 A
careful review of books and records, along with research into the petitioner's labor relations, will supply the necessary "ounce of prevention" in an
area in which the cure is painful and difficult to apply.
As another factor, the court required an investigation of benefits that
will accrue to the employer should rejection be permitted. This is certain to
be of value. If by rejection the asset-to-liability ratio of the employer will
be increased, rejection should be considered as among the appropriate
forms of relief. But if rejection will have little beneficial effect on the
9
employer, the propriety of rejection is questionable. 1
Finally, the court recommended a careful weighing of the equities.
Implicit in this recommendation is the suggestion that although rejection of
88. The employer's motivation caused some concern in Teamsters Local 886 v. Quick
Charge, Inc., 168 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1948), and in In reMamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
89. This is not to imply that the Bankruptcy Act is to have priority over the labor acts,
since such a proposition would tend to defeat the policy of the labor acts. It does recognize,
however, that the starting point in a petition for rejection of anyexecutory contract is a survey
of the financial condition of the debtor and the effect on that debtor of the contract sought to
be rejected.
90. Although it is questionable whether large multinational corporations would engage
in such activity, the small employer operating on a narrow profit margin and troubled with
labor unrest might well consider bankruptcy, with its consequent rejection of a burdensome
collective bargaining agreement, a viable alternative. In this context, the "floodgates"
argument of the NLRB begins to appear more credible.
91. Like the other factors enumerated by the court, this consideration of the benefits to
be gained from rejection must be made in light of all other factors. If the financial condition of
the employer is such that nothing will aid its recovery, it would appear that the question of
allowing rejection becomes moot, since liquidation and distribution of all assets seems likely
to follow, along with discharge of all employees. Even when it appears that nothing can save
the debtor, the collective bargaining agreement should still be looked to for provisions
regarding dissolution or liquidation, which may inure to the benefit of the employees.
An example of this consideration is found in REA Express, in which REA alleged that it
could meet neither the unemployment provisions of the labor agreement nor the wage scales
called for in the agreement. Specific allegations aid the courts in determining the benefits to be
gained by rejection.

collective bargaining agreements is within the power of the trustee in
bankruptcy, a presumption against the propriety of rejection exists. In
announcing this consideration, the court departed from the proposition that
the power of a trustee to reject under section 313(1) is limited only by the
requirement that the contract be detrimental to the estate. The court made it
clear that the power of the trustee is narrowly circumscribed in light of the
potential injuries to employees. The implication is that even if the other
criteria are satisfied, rejection will be disallowed if, overall, the equities in
favor of allowing rejection fail to outweigh the equities in favor of its
denial.

C.

92

REA Express-Factsand Analysis

1. The Facts.-This case 93 arose from the district court's determination that the collective bargaining agreements at issue were burdensome and that, since section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act placed no
restriction on the type of executory contract a trustee could reject, they
could be rejected. 94 Thus the court reversed the bankruptcy judge's
decision that rejection of collective bargaining agreements was not within
the overall scheme of chapter XI. 95 The union promptly appealed the
reversal on the grounds that the plain language of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) prohibits rejection of collective bargaining agreements made by the
debtor-carrier except in the manner prescribed by the RLA. 96 REA alleged
that unemployment compensation provisions in the labor agreements
would prevent it from adopting and implementing a reorganization plan
and that it was unable to meet the full wage scales provided in the
agreements.
After reviewing the policies of both the RLA and the Bankruptcy
Act, 97 the court concluded that whenever "an onerous and burdensome
executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a
92. The slight criticism that can be directed at the court's resolution of the issues is best
directed at its failure to consider more carefully some of the factors at work in the problems
presented. The quick dismissal by the Kevin Steel court of the NLRB's contention that
employers might flock to bankruptcy courts to free themselves of the burdens of collective
bargaining agreements is one such failure. If employers are willing to shut down an operation
completely in order to avoid a union contract, there is little reason to doubt that employers of
the same persuasion would take the seemingly less drastic step of petitioning for a Chapter XI
rearrangement. It may be true, as the court believed, that "businessmen make the best
bargain they can with unions if they want to stay in business." But the businessman who
comes away from the bargaining table with less than he had hoped to achieve may see
bankruptcy and contract rejection as a favorable alternative to a total plant shut down.
93. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
94. Id. at 167 (citing the district court).
95. Id. (citing the bankruptcy court).
96. Railway Labor Act §§ 2,6,45 U.S.C. §§ 152,156(1970). Seenotes 53 and 54 supra.
97. The purpose of these provisions of the RLA . . .is to avoid disruptions of
commerce by forcing the parties to exhaust collective bargaining procedures and
. . .to encourage use of arbitration and mediation before engaging in self-help,
strikes or other forms of unilateral action. . . .[S]ection [313(1)] enables the court
to implement the policy of Chapter XI, which is to permit the debtor in possession to
deal with the debtor's property in a way that will enable it to survive, by relieving it of
executory contracts that would threaten or prevent its survival.
523 F.2d at 168-69.

failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse," the court may authorize
rejection or disaffirmance of the agreement under section 313(1).98 Despite
specific prohibitions in both the Bankruptcy Act and the RLA against
termination of collective bargaining agreements except by procedures set
forth in the RLA, rejection and termination was allowed and justified on
the basis of policy.
2. Analysis.-While the basic issue in Kevin Steel and REA
Express is the same, it is significant that REA Express arose pursuant to the

Railway Labor Act. 99 The differences between the RLA and NLRA are
basic enough to justify different results. A strict reading of section 77(n) of
the Bankruptcy Act °0 in conjunction with sections 2 and 6 of the RLA, 10
prior to a reading of the court's opinion, might lead one to the erroneous
belief that a conclusion different from that in Kevin Steel was reached in
REA Express. Such is not the case.
Early in the REA Express opinion the court construed Kevin Steel as
having held that "the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement
must yield to the bankruptcy court's power to relieve the debtor's successor
in bankruptcy immediately of onerous and burdensome executory contracts.""

By resort to the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Act and the

RLA, in much the same manner as it had done in Kevin Steel, the court
concluded that a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA is
governed by the same principles. Policy, not the letter of the law,
controlled the outcome of the case.
(a) Apparent conflict in language andpurposes of RLA andBankruptcy
Act resolved.-Insisting that the conflict between the two acts is only
apparent, the court reasoned that it is proper to authorize rejection under
section 313(1) when, after a careful weighing of the equities, it is found
that an onerous and burdensome executory contract (including a collective
bargaining agreement) will "thwart" efforts to save a failing carrier in
bankruptcy.' 1 3 Indeed, to forbid rejection under these circumstances
would defeat the purposes of the RLA, which seeks to avoid disruption of
interstate carrier service."1 o4 Faced with the options of abiding by the letter
of the Bankruptcy Act as it applies to the RLA, with a resultant defeat of the
policies of both acts, or of looking beyond the letter of the law to seek an
accommodation of those policies, the court chose the latter. In the writer's
opinion, when total ruin and liquidation is the only alternative to allowing
98. Id. at 169. The court continued:
To hold that the RLA precludes rejection under such circumstances would ultimately be to defeat the purpose of the RLA itself, which is to avoid disruption of
commerce by insuring that the carrier will continue operations pending resolution of
labor disputes. ...
99. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
100. See note 53 supra.
101. See note 54 supra.
102. 523 F.2d at 168.
103. Id. at 169.
104. Id. See note 98 supra.

rejection of a labor agreement, the Bankruptcy Act must govern and allow
a quick rejection of the burdensome contract. Employees will gain little if
they retain their agreement while losing their employer.
(b) Application of successorshipprinciplesto REA as debtor in possession.-REA Express is the first case explicitly to apply successorship
principles to a trustee in bankruptcy, 05 imposing the Burnsduty to bargain
in good faith °6 and extending the Burns rights of successor employers to
REA as debtor in possession under the more stringent RLA. Although the
successor is under a duty to bargain, there is no correlative duty to refrain
from changing the terms of employment prior to the initiation of such
bargaining. The new employer has the right unilaterally to set the terms on
which it will hire new employees. The only obligations imposed on REA in
this regard were the requirements that it give reasonable notice of its
proposed terms and that it negotiate in good faith for a reasonable time
before putting them into effect.' 07 Otherwise, to require union acquiescence to the suggested terms would have the same effect as requiring the
08
debtor to operate under the existing labor agreement.
(c) Considerationson remand.-Without listing the factors announced
in Kevin Steel, the court remanded the case "substantially for the reasons
stated" in remanding Kevin Steel. l9 As in the earlier case, the court
emphasized that the power to reject a collective bargaining agreement is
not so broad as the power to reject any executory contract, holding that
rejection should be authorized "only where it clearly appears to be the
lesser of two evils and [when it appears] that, unless the agreement is
rejected, the carrier will collapse and the employees will no longer have
105. "These [successorship] principles [as announced in Burns] are particularly applicable to the efforts of a trustee or debtor in possession to save a carrier from complete collapse
and liquidation." 523 F.2d at 170.
106. [REA] as a new employer is obligated to bargain collectively with the representative of the employees hired by it. The Supreme Court so held with respect to a new
employer in a case governed by the NLRA. . .and the result under the RLA is the
same.
Id.
107. Id. at 171. The court was not troubled by the language of §6of the RLA, which sets
forth "elaborate and protracted procedures" to be followed before any changes in wages,
hours, terms, or conditions of employment can be made. Policy considerations were considered paramount.
Although much of the reasoning of Burnswas applied to the bankruptcy situation in REA
Express, the following language from Burns was considered not to be controlling:
There will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to
retain all the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him
initially consult with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms.
406 U.S. at 294-95. The Second Circuit saw this language as "dictum" and held that this
"suggested exception" was limited to situations in which employees are led by the successor
"to believe that they will have continuity of employment on preexisting terms." REA had
made it clear to the employees that changes in conditions and terms of employment were
imminent. 523 F.2d at 171-72.
108. As was mentioned in the discussion of Kevin Steel above, rejection of the labor
agreement does not leave the employees devoid of protection. REA is a debtor in possession
and a new employer that has retained substantially all of the employees of the predecessor
(pre-bankrupt) employer. As such, it is clearly obligated to bargain collectively with the
representative of the retained employees.
109. 523 F.2d at 172.

their jobs." I0 Thus it would seem that rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement is to be allowed as the final attempt to save a failing enterprisea device to be used only if necessary to prevent total collapse of the
debtor. " '
V.

Conclusion

Both Kevin Steel and REA Express represent refinements of, not
departures from, the established rule that a trustee in bankruptcy possesses
the power to reject a collective bargaining agreement. 12
' Both decisions are
laudable for their harmonious blending of the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Act and the several labor acts. Although these cases serve as
precedent only in the Second Circuit, the remaining circuits would do well
to study their rationale and expand upon it when faced with the same issues.
It is regrettable that the Supreme Court has denied the petition for certiorari
in REA Express, for its pronouncement would establish a basis for uniform
113
resolution of future problems in this area of the law.
Caution is mandatory in the court's consideration of both the employer's motivation in filing for bankruptcy and its financial condition. A
heavy burden of proof should be imposed on petitioning employers to the
extent that employers must demonstrate that forced compliance with the
terms of existing agreements will certainly result in collapse. Although
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will often result in injury to
employees, some injury is acceptable if necessary to assure employees of
continued empiuy,1unt. But if the employer will survive despite continued
enforcement of the agreement, the injuries to employees stemming from
rejection are not justified.
A final recommendation, perhaps implicit in the holdings of these two
cases, is that courts should look first to executory contracts other than the
collective bargaining agreement. For example, unexecuted contracts for
the purchase of raw materials and equipment should be rejected before
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is contemplated. Only when
rejection of such other contracts has failed reasonably to assure the
110. Id.
111. The court's failure to distinguish In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359
(E.D.N.Y. 1965), should be noted. Whether REA Express has overruled Overseas is open to
debate, but there can be little doubt that the unqualified refusal by the Overseas court to allow
modification or cancellation of a collective bargaining agreement except in conformity with
the RLA is at odds with the reasoning of the Second Circuit. Overseas was not ignored by the
REA Express court; it was cited. 523 F.2d at 172. Perhaps because it agreed with the language
of Overseas regarding protection of employee rights, the circuit court declined to overrule it.
A statement clarifying this situation would have been appropriate.
112. The "refinement" of the successorship doctrine, see note 108 and accompanying
text supra, cannot be overlooked.
113. Especially in the field of labor-management relations, urgent pleas for the maintenance of uniformity resound. Suggested amendments to the NLRA which would vest the
federal district courts with jurisdiction over unfair labor practices have been attacked on the
basis of this "uniformity" argument. See H.R. 9214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). A general
discussion of this topic is found in ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 218 (1974).

continued existence of the debtor should rejection of the labor agreement
be considered." 4
Those who favor a strict interpretation of statutory language will
probably not be pleased by these decisions, and will doubtless find REA
Express the more disturbing of the two cases. Yet, of the few cases that
have considered the question of rejection of collective bargaining agreements by trustees in bankruptcy, these two cases have given the most
detailed and best reasoned analysis. By carefully considering the effects of
rejection on all parties, the Second Circuit reached commendable solutions
in each case. It is fitting that two apparently conflicting statutes were
reconciled by resort to the underlying policies which those statutes were
intended to express, without hindrance by the words used to express them.

THOMAS

C.

BONNER

114. A "rule of reason" would necessarily apply to this suggested proposal. Executory
contracts for materials and services essential to plant operation, would, of course, be outside
the scope of the proposal.

